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Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. The idea of a privileged 
relation between touch and the body, however, has remained mostly unchallenged. This 
has led many physiologists, psychologists and philosophers to subscribe to a bodily view 
of touch, according to which the mark of touch, by contrast to other senses, is to be 
related to the body in some specific way. Here we shall consider the relation between 
touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives. On the one hand, we shall 
discuss the body template theory of touch according to which touch is defined by the fact 
that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We shall contrast the body template 
theory with other theories of individuation of touch. We shall then expose in details the 
difficulties and advantages of defining touch by its proper object, and more particularly 
pressure. On the other hand, we shall discuss the body map theory according to which 
tactile sensations are localized within the frame of reference provided by the mental 
representation of the space of the body. We shall oppose it to the Local Sign theory and 
review of series of putative counterexamples to the body map theory.  
 
1. Defining touch  
Touch is more elusive than hearing, sight, smell or taste. The problem is not that the 
biological underpinnings are less known for touch than for other senses. The problem is 
rather conceptual: what we mean by touch is not always sharply delineated. What is the 
explanandum of the various biological, psychological, and psychophysical theories of 
touch? There is little consensus. Here we shall examine several candidates, including 
intentional objects, organs, stimuli and the relation to the body.  
 
1.1 The impalpable nature of touch 
The problem was first noted by Aristotle (De Anima, 422b17-424a16). Sensory 
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modalities, Aristotle argued, are to be individuated by their intentional object. The 
difficulty, however, is that prima facie tactile objects do not constitute a natural class. Let 
us call the proper object of a sensory modality, the entity that we directly perceive 
through this modality only; and its primary object, the entity that we directly perceive 
through it as a matter of necessity (Sanford, 1976). It is classically assumed that the 
primary and proper objects of sight, hearing, taste and smell are respectively color, sound, 
taste and smell. The proper objects of touch, however, are at first sight too heterogeneous 
to constitute a natural class and to be its primary objects. Hardness, solidity, 
impenetrability, texture, weight, mass, pressure, tension, contact, temperature, humidity, 
vibrations, painfulness, ticklishness, wetness and so forth have all been claimed to be 
perceived by touch exclusively. Yet, it is highly unlikely that they all belong to the same 
natural class. Furthermore, it is dubious that each instance of tactile perception 
necessarily involves the perception of some hardness, vibration, temperature, texture, and 
so forth. 
Faced with the heterogeneity of the proper objects of touch, one may renounce 
defining touch by its intentional objects. Suppose one endorses a biological criterion 
instead. On this view, sensory modalities are individuated by their proper and primary 
organ. Touch is then defined by the biological apparatus (including organs, tissues, and 
receptors) dedicated to touch only and that touch necessarily involves. The skin is often 
put forward as the proper and primary organ of touch. But it is neither. First, the skin is 
not only a perceptual organ, it also accomplishes several other functions that we do not 
want to include in tactile perception (including protection, heat regulation, perspiration 
and respiration). Second, tactile perception does not essentially involve skin stimulation. 
Touch on the eyes, on mucous membranes such as the mouth, on internal organs, and on 
teethes can induce tactile sensations as well. One might even conceive that skinless 
creatures (such as arthropods) have tactile sensations.  
Looking for more specific organs, one faces an impressive anatomical and functional 
diversity of receptors involved in touch (Johnson, 2001). Some are dedicated to the 
perception of mechanical properties such as pressure, vibration and texture, some to the 
perception of tissue damage, some to the perception of temperature. Each sub-group is 
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itself heterogeneous. The mechanoreceptors include the Meissner and Pacini corpuscles, 
Ruffini organs, Merkel disks and free nerves endings. All are anatomically and 
functionally heterogeneous: their location in the skin varies (some in the dermis, some in 
the epidermis, some – the Ruffini organs – are even also found in the joints); their 
activation threshold and adaptation rates differ (Vallbo and Johansson, 1984; Kandel et 
al., 2000, p. 438); they are innervated by different kinds of fibers, myelinated or not. 
They are classified as cutaneous mechanoreceptors only insofar as they allow us to be 
conscious of mechanical properties and/or they respond to mechanical stimuli.
1
 But if we 
need to appeal to intentional objects or stimuli to individuate organs, then the organ 
criterion for individuating the senses is not fundamental (Roxbee-Cox, 1970).  
Is there then any sui generis kind of physical stimuli that is necessarily and 
exclusively involved in tactile perception? Mechanical properties are sometimes put 
forward, but they may be also involved in other sensory modalities. Arguably, chemical 
property involved in olfactory and gustative perception, electromagnetic property 
involved in sight, and acoustic property involved in hearing are all kinds of mechanical 
properties. Besides, electromagnetic and chemical properties are also involved in tactile 
perception. It is actually unclear that physics – be it Newtonian, relativistic or quantum 
mechanics – provides us with any categorization of physical properties that matches the 
categorization of our senses. 
Whether one relies on intentional objects, organs or stimuli, our ordinary concept of 
touch appears on closer inspection to be a rag-bag sense that scatters in many sub-senses
2
.  
Such a multi-sensory view of touch, so to speak, is implicitly assumed in many textbooks, 
but it is hardly satisfying (Fulkerson, 2011). First, it is hardly a conception of touch since 
it boils down to dissolving its explandum into a disjunction of senses. Second, it is a 
                                                        
1
 By contrast to intentional objects, one is not necessarily aware of physical stimuli in perception. 
2 It is not clear that any other criterion (including qualia, sensori-motor contingencies, and associated 
beliefs) or combination of criteria for distinguishing the senses fares better as far as the unity of touch is 
concerned.  
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strongly revisionary view, which is committed to dismiss ordinary intuitions about touch 
like intuitions about the privileged role of touch in our access to external reality or 
intuitions about the particular relation between touch and bodily awareness. These 
intuitions, however, may help us to reach some definition of touch that preserves its 
unity, as illustrated by the bodily theories of touch. 
 
1.2 Bodily theories of touch 
Even if sight and hearing are defined by their objects, organs or stimuli, things may 
go differently for touch. The main proposal of this type relies on the common observation 
that tactile perception always involves some experience of our own body in combination 
with the experience of external objects. In other words, touch is bipolar (Katz, 1925). One 
can then take a second step and argue that the specific nature of touch consists in its 
relation to bodily awareness. This view can be tracked back at least to the Middle Age 
philosopher P. J. Olivi (see Yrjönsuuri, 2008) and more recent proponents include 
Armstrong (1962), O‘Shaughnessy (1989, 2003) and Martin (1992, 1993). Touch, by 
contrast to other senses, would enter into specific dependence relation with the awareness 
of our body. 
A difficulty for this approach is to specify the exact relation between touch and bodily 
awareness. For it has been proposed that proprioception plays a role in every sensory 
modality (O‘Dea, 2011). In order for bodily theories of touch to work, other senses must 
not depend on bodily awareness in the same way. The most refined proposal to date is 
that bodily perception functions as a template for tactile perception. In a nutshell, our 
body is geometrically congruent with the external objects so that the awareness of our 
body gives us access to the spatial properties of the external object. For instance, 
Armstrong (1962, p. 18) argues that we perceive convex objects by feeling concavities of 
our flesh. The relation to bodily awareness is even more striking for so called haptic 
touch. According to O‘Shaughnessy (2003, pp. 629, 656-680) and Martin (1992, 1993), 
we perceive the circularity of an object by feeling the circularity of the motion of our 
hand around it through proprioception. Template theories of touch, however, face three 
objections. 
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First, they can account for the perception of spatial properties such as shape, but they 
fail for the perception of other properties such as weight, pressures and solidity. One way 
to go, which is endorsed by Armstrong (1962, pp. 21-32), is to claim that all tangible 
properties are reducible to spatial ones. Such a spatial reduction of tangible properties, 
however, clashes with the fact that felt weight or pressures might vary independently of 
any felt spatial variation (a fact later recognized by Armstrong, 1997, pp. 97-8). 
Second, it is true that the content of tactile perception can be congruent with the 
content of bodily awareness. It is also true that this does not generally occur in other 
sensory modalities. But it can happen (Scott, 2001). For example, in tunnel vision (in 
which peripheral vision is completely lost, so that vision is restricted to a narrow, tunnel-
like, central field), the visual content is congruent with the proprioceptive content: the 
motion of our eyes matches the shape of the explored object (e.g. Loomis et al., 1991). 
Third, even if one grants that tactile content, and only tactile content, is necessarily 
congruent with proprioceptive content, it is still doubtful that such congruence is essential 
to touch. As we shall explain in section 2, we sympathize with the general hypothesis 
according to which touch exhibits some specific relation with bodily awareness. 
However, we do not think that this is an essential property of touch. Our main worry with 
the bodily template theories of touch is that they entail that touch is not a sense in the 
same way as sight, hearing, smell and taste. Touch is distinct from all the other senses 
because of its privileged relation to proprioception. But sight, hearing, smell and taste are 
not distinct from each other because of their relation to proprioception. The criterion for 
distinguishing senses ends up being disjunctive. One version of it could be the following: 
x is a sensory modality if and only if either x has a natural class of proper and primary 
objects or x uses proprioception as a template. This threatens the very unity of the 
concept of sensory modality. Advocates of the template theories of touch save the unity 
of the concept of touch, but at the price of dismantling the concept of sense.
3
 The bullet 
seems to us hard to bite. A good definition of touch should not only explain the unity of 
touch; it should also account for its sensory character: touch is one single sensory 
                                                        
3
 They indeed declare themselves quite pessimistic about the concept of sensory modality (O‘Shaughnessy, 
2003, p. 630; Martin, 1992, p. 215). 
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modality like any others. 
To recap, one faces the following dilemma when defining touch: either one gives up 
the intuition that touch is a single sense by claiming that it is a heterogeneous collection 
of senses; or one gives up the view that touch is a sensory modality by claiming that its 
unity-maker – e.g. its relation to the body – is distinct in kind from the unity-makers of 
other sensory modalities. Either touch is not a sense, or touch is not a sense. Hopefully, 
this dilemma is not inescapable. 
 
1.3 The pressure theory of touch 
Following the intentionalist approach of the individuation of the senses, which 
distinguish sensory modalities by their proper and primary objects, we propose to revive 
the hypothesis that touch is the direct perception of pressure and tension. This view was 
introduced by Weber in 1846, right from the beginning of experimental psychology:  
[Touch] is essentially a sense of force. Our concepts of force would be very 
much less well developed were we unable to feel pressure, or to sense competing 
forces in which an equilibrium is established so that no movements are produced, 
yet in which the forces can still be felt. (Weber, 1846, p. 196)  
Pressure, we shall now argue, is the proper and primary object of touch. On the one hand, 
pressure cannot be directly seen or heard, although its causes and effects can. On the 
other hand, one can never perceive by touch without feeling some pressure or tension. 
Touch is by nature the direct perception of pressure and tension. In other words, pressure 
is the color of touch. Weber‘s proposal of a pressure sense was confirmed by the 
discovery of pressure spots on the skin (Blix, 1884; Goldscheider, 1884; Donaldson, 
1885), which were soon associated with sui generis end-organs by Von Frey (see Boring, 
1942, Norrsell et al., 1999, Pearce, 2005). On both phenomenological and physiological 
grounds, the existence of a pressure sense is hardly controversial.  
Such a pressure sense, however, has remained mostly unnoticed by philosophers (at 
the exception of Armstrong, 1993, pp. 97-9; 1997, p. 213; Sanford, 1976; Perkins, 1983, 
242 sqq.; Fales, 1990, p. 16). One reason for this neglect might be the cartesian and 
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humean prejudice against dynamic entities such as force, pressure or tension. If touch is 
to be the perception of pressure and tension, then there must be such things. Here, we 
shall assume that macroscopic force and tension are real physical entities, distinct from 
their kinematic effects, rather than mere theoretical fictions (see Wilson, 2007; Massin, 
2009 for arguments in favor of realism about newtonian forces). 
In order to know what touch is, one thus needs to venture into the metaphysics of 
pressure: what are they? Let us first consider forces. Forces are entities of dynamics. 
Dynamics is to be contrasted with kinematics (and not with statics). Kinematics describes 
motion; dynamics causally explains motion. Consequently, dynamics entities, including 
forces, mass and energy, neither consist in motion, nor cause motion. According to 
Newton‘s second law of motion, forces cause accelerations of the bodies they exert on, 
when not counteracted by other forces. A body submitted to the influence of a single 
force, such as a body in free fall, is not subject to any pressure. The reason is that nothing 
prevents that single force from causing the acceleration of the body. Such a solitary force 
acting on a body is not perceptible by touch. In order for a force to be perceptible, it has 
to be counteracted by another force, which is often the one exerted by our body, such as 
when we weight an object. Only then do pressure and tension occur. Pressure, as noted by 
Weber, only arises when two forces act against each other and cancel each other. The 
same is true for tension. In order to put a stick under pressure, one needs to exert two 
inward forces on each of its extremities. In order to put a rope under tension, one has to 
exert two outward forces on each of its extremities. Pressure and tension are pairs of 
antagonist forces. Pace humeans, the pressure exerted on a body might vary without it 
moving or undergoing any other spatial change. Likewise, one might feel an object 
steadily pressing on our body even when it no longer moves relative to the body (Perkins, 
1983, p. 248). This remains true even when tactile adaptation occurs. To claim that touch 
is the sense of pressure and tension amounts to claim that the proper and primary object 
of touch is a pair of antagonist forces. 
If the pressure theory of touch is not to fall under the same criticism as the template 
theory, then one must assume that other sensory modalities are defined thanks to their 
proper and primary object as well. This assumption might be found a bit too bold in the 
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context of the contemporary debate about sensory individuation (MacPherson, 2011). 
Surely more needs to be said in defense of the intentionalist criterion of individuation of 
the senses (see for example, Brentano, 1979; Roxbee-Cox, 1970; Sanford, 1976; Dretske, 
1995; Ross, 2001, 2008). Suffice it to say here that the present pressure theory of touch 
dismisses one of the main objections raised against the intentionalist criterion since 
Aristotle, namely the alleged lack of proper object for touch. 
It has to be granted, however, that such a proposal entails that touch in the strict sense 
does not cover all the types of perception traditionally ascribed to it. In particular, the 
perception of temperatures and of pain needs to be excluded from touch proper. 
Temperature is indeed not pressure (though it might depend on pressure) and there is no 
promising way of grounding the perceptual awareness of temperature on the perceptual 
awareness of pressure. We feel that the temperature in the shade is cold without feeling 
the shadow or the air pressing on us. Temperature is not felt through pressure. Second, it 
might be that pain is a sensory quality, on a par with color, sound, pressure and 
temperature (as first clearly stated by Stumpf, 1928). Here again, pain might be felt 
independently of pressure. Plausibly, the main reason why the temperature sense, the pain 
sense, and the pressure sense have been fused into one single sense is that temperature, 
pain, and pressure are often felt in the same location, namely, in parts of our body 
(Weber, 1848, p. 69; Mill, 1869, vol. 1, p. 30; Brentano, 1995, p. 83). Despite this felt co-
location, they have intentional object of different categories, independent from each 
other. Touch in the generic sense therefore splits into the sense of pressure (touch in the 
strict sense), the sense of temperature and, possibly, the sense of pain. 
The pressure theory of touch, however, does not amount to a sheer giving up of the 
unity of touch, for the splitting of touch ends up there. There is no need to introduce 
further senses of texture, vibration, weight, contact, hardness or solidity. The tactile 
perception of each of those actually depends on the perception of pressure and tension. 
There is no sui generis sense of texture distinct from the sense of pressure, for we feel the 
texture of a surface by feeling a spatio-temporal pattern of pressure when stroking it. 
There is no sui generis sense of vibration (pace Katz, 1925), for we feel vibration by 
feeling a temporal pattern of pressure on our body. There is no sui generis sense of 
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weight for we perceive the weight of an object by perceiving the various pressure and 
tension that it exerts on our skin and muscles when wielding it. There is no sui generis 
contact sense for we feel that some object is in contact with our body by feeling that it 
presses, be it very slightly, on our skin. There is no sui generis sense of hardness for we 
feel that a body is hard by perceiving that pressing or pulling it does not change its shape. 
There is no sui generis sense of solidity or impenetrability for we feel that a body is 
impenetrable, by perceiving that pressing our body against it does not yield 
compenetration of our body with it. No texture, no vibration, no weight, no instance of 
contact, hardness, or impenetrability is ever tactually felt independently of the feeling of a 
pressure or tension. Such qualities are indirectly perceived on the basis of the direct 
perception of pressure.  
One might object that such a claim commits its proponents to some questionable 
atomistic approach to sensory psychology, according to which felt texture, weight or 
vibration are either reducible to a summation of isolated sensation of pressure or inferred 
on the basis of the prior perception of such isolated pressure. This is not the case. On the 
one hand, pressures, on the basis of which other qualities are felt, are not necessarily 
spatially punctual or temporally instantaneous entities. There might be pressure-gestalts 
that expand over space and time. On the other hand, the notion of indirect perception does 
not necessarily imply that what is indirectly perceived is reducible to, nor inferred from, 
what is directly perceived. Our claim is only that texture, vibration, weight and solidity 
are perceived in virtue of the perception of pressure, and not the reverse (Jackson, 1977, 
pp. 19-20). To say that only pressure and tension are directly perceived in touch is not 
even to claim that they are the most salient properties in tactile perception. Attention 
might go directly to the constant and distal properties of the felt bodies. But even if we 
focus on hardness, weight or texture, these are tactually accessed thanks to the possibly 
sub-attentional consciousness of pressure and tension. Felt pressure and tension are the 
tactual matter that underlies all tactual perception (Katz, 1935, §5). 
 
1.4 The objectivity of touch 
Defining touch as the sense of pressure and tension therefore allows defining touch in 
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the same way as other sensory modalities while saving a substantial part of its unity. This 
is only one of the advantages of the pressure theory of touch. In addition, the theory can 
account for two specific features commonly ascribed to touch that cry for explanation. 
The first might be called the objectivity of touch. The second is the aforementioned 
bipolarity of touch.  
As echoed in the use ‗tangible‘, which often means ‗real‘, touch appears to enjoy some 
priority over the other senses when we wonder about the reality of external bodies. This 
priority should not be understood in terms of a better reliability of touch with respect to 
other senses. This priority is rather phenomenological: only tangible objects can be 
presented to us as real, that is, as existing independently of us. This may seem 
controversial. For example, Siegel (2006) argues that ordinary visual experiences do 
represent the independence of their objects from the subject. When seeing an object, one 
expects that changing one‘s perspective on it will not change its location.4 However, 
Siegel‘s theory explicitly targets property-independence, i.e. the fact that perceptual 
objects are presented as exemplifying properties (such as location) independently of us. 
By contrast, the present proposal targets existential-independence, i.e. the fact that we are 
sometimes presented with the fact that the perceived object exists independently of us. It 
is only with respect to existential-independence that touch has some privilege over other 
senses. The point is not that other sensory modalities present us with their object as 
existentially dependent on us. Our claim is only that ordinary perception is mute with 
respect to the mind-independence of the existence of its objects. One reason for this is 
that independence from the subject is both a self-reflexive and modal (or essential) 
notion, and that it would be quite a heavy task for ordinary perception to present it on the 
top of its immediate objects.  
Touch, to that extent, plays an essential role in the phenomenology of self-world 
dualism. The pressure theory of touch paves the way for a neat explanation of tactile 
                                                        
4
 But is it mind-independence or rather perspective-independence (independence from a point of view, 
which needs not be presented as a subject‘s point of view) that is presented here? Alternatively, one might 
challenge Siegel‘s claim that such expectations are parts of the perceptual content itself, rather than aroused 
by a simple perceptual content. 
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objectivity, as follows:  
P1 The feeling of physical effort (and of resistance) is the only experience that 
presents us with the existential independence of the physical world from us.  
P2 Touch is the only sensory modality essential to the feeling of physical effort.  
C Touch is the only sensory modality essential to the experience of the physical 
world as existing independently from us.  
Following a long tradition, we shall assume the truth of P1.
5
 In order to ascertain P2, 
we need to clarify the nature of physical effort. An agent makes an effort on a body if and 
only if it exerts a force on that body so as to make it move (or stay at rest) and that this 
body exerts in return some opposite force on the agent (i.e. resistance). Given that 
pressure and tension are pairs of antagonist forces, this entails that there is no physical 
effort without pressure or tension. Likewise, there is no experience of physical effort 
without experience of physical pressure or tension. Since experiences of tension and 
pressure are, on our account, tactile experiences, then tactile experiences, and only them, 
are essential to the feeling of effort. In other words, in order to feel the resistance of the 
external world, we have to be aware that that it exerts some force counteracting the force 
we are intentionally exerting on it. Such pairs of counteracting forces are the proper and 
primary objects of touch. If so, no being completely deprived of touch could ever 
experience the existential independence of physical bodies.  
This is not say that tactile perception per se presents us with the mind-independence of 
its objects. It does not. Experience of effort does, which is essentially tactile, but which is 
not essential to tactile perception. This is neither to claim that ordinary perception, 
including tactile perception, does not present us with mind-independent objects. It does. 
But ordinary perception does not present us with their mind-independence per se. Our 
point is only that touch is the only sense required for the experience of the mind-
                                                        
5 See e.g. Maine de Biran (1820); Brown (1846, p. 151); Müller (1842, p. 1080); Mill (1869); Bain (1868, 
p. 82); Dilthey (2010); Scheler (1973b; 1973a, pp. 135-8); Baldwin (1906); Katz (1935, p. 8; 1989, 51); 
Stout (1931, Bk IV, chap. 1 & 6); Hampshire (1982); Garnett (1965); Hamlyn (1990); Baldwin (1995); 
Russell (1995); Bermudez (1998, p. 164); Smith (2002); Williams (2002, p. 136); Cassam (1999); Matthen 
(2005, p. 8). 
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independence of physical bodies. There lies its greater objectivity.  
On the present proposal, the objectivity of touch results from the nature of touch 
together with the nature of physical effort. As it stands, such an account of tactile 
objectivity is still a rough sketch. Though we are confident that more can be said in 
support of this approach, our present point is quite modest. Any good theory touch should 
either account for tactile objectivity or explain it away. The pressure theory of touch, 
contrary to its rivals, suggests some fairly promising explanation of tactile objectivity.  
A second feature of tactile perception that needs to be accounted for by any theory of 
touch is its aforementioned bipolarity, that is, the fact that every instance of tactile 
perception presents us not only with external objects, but also with our body. Here again, 
the pressure theory of touch provides some natural explanation. On the pressure theory of 
touch, the bipolarity of touch follows from the nature of touch together with a likely 
hypothesis: pressure felt in touch is generally pressure between (parts of) our body and 
some external object. Pressure is a symmetrical relation: we feel something pressing on 
this part of our body (or that this part of our body is pressing on something). The reason 
why touch is bipolar is that its proper and primary objects are relations, whose relata are 
generally parts of our body and external objects. This is not so with sound or color: 
though their location might be perceived as relation to our own location, their very sound- 
or color-quality is not presented in terms of a relation between something and part of our 
body. The bipolarity of touch results from the relational character of its proper and 
primary object.  
This explanation of tactile bipolarity relies on the hypothesis that pressure felt in 
touch consists in relation between (parts of) our body and some object, and consequently, 
that felt pressure is always located on our body. This may come as a surprise: if pressure 
is to touch what sound is to hearing, how is it that contrary to sound, pressure is always 
felt to be located on our body?  
 
2 Localizing tactile sensations  
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When we have tactile sensations, we normally experience pressure to be applied on a 
specific part of our body. We localize tactile sensations on our body, so to speak.
6
 We can 
then form a belief about the felt location of the sensations and report it (e.g., ―I feel 
pressure on the shoulder‖), attend to it (e.g. by looking at the shoulder), indicate it (e.g., 
by pointing to the shoulder), and act accordingly (e.g., by removing the object that is 
touching the shoulder). Furthermore, tactile sensations are bodily sensations. One way to 
interpret this claim is in spatial terms. At first sight, it seems indeed that the localization 
of tactile sensations is always within the boundaries of our body. However, like for other 
types of bodily sensations, the localization of tactile sensations displays puzzling features, 
which do not seem to be captured by typical treatments of spatiality. Most discussions in 
the literature have focused on the use of ―in‖ when one localizes pain. For instance, the 
pain that I feel in my leg is not felt in the refrigerator when my leg is in the refrigerator 
(Coburn, 1966). Nor is the pain that I feel in my thumb felt in my mouth when my thumb 
is in my mouth (Block, 1983). But one can raise similar questions if one considers the use 
of ―on‖ when one reports ―I feel pressure on my hand‖. For instance, I feel a light 
pressure on my hand; my hand is on my head; yet, I do not feel pressure on my head. The 
rule of spatial transitivity is not preserved. The peculiarities of the localization of tactile 
sensations might cast doubt on their intrinsic spatiality. But if tactile sensations are not 
essentially spatial, then their privileged relation to the body might disappear. They may 
be localized on the body most of the time, but there would be no necessity to it. The 
relation would be only contingent. Here, we shall determine whether tactile sensations are 
essentially localized and what constraints, if any, lay upon the localization of tactile 
sensations.  
 
2.1 Are tactile sensations essentially spatial?  
How are tactile sensations individuated? Are they individuated exclusively by the 
type and intensity of the pressure exerted on the body? Or are they also individuated by 
                                                        
6
 This is not to say that we localize the mental event of the tactile sensation in our body. Rather, we localize 
what we tactually feel, that is, the physical event of pressure.  
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their felt location? Let us consider for example that pressure of the same intensity is 
applied on two distinct parts of the body inducing two tactile sensations. Are the two 
sensations strictly similar or not? In other words, is the spatial component a constitutive 
part of tactile sensations or is it independently acquired and then associated to tactile 
sensations? The latter view has been defended by the Local Sign theory in the 19
th
 
century (Lotze, 1888; Wundt, 1897; Titchener, 1908; James, 1890), which can be 
summarized as follows: 
the theory which denies that there can be in a sensation any element of actual 
locality, any tone as it were which cries to us immediately and without further 
ado, ‗I am here‘, or ‗I am there‘. (James, 1890, p. 798) 
On this view, the localization of tactile sensations is not grounded on spatial 
information carried by tactile signals. Rather, it is grounded on the sensation of a 
―peculiar qualitative coloring‖ associated to each sensible nerve (Wundt, 1897) or of an 
―auxiliary impression‖ of the specificity of the flesh that is touched (Lotze, 1888).  
However, this view has been widely criticized because of the lack of such local signs 
(Vesey, 1961; Coburn, 1966; Martin, 1995; O‘Shaughnessy, 1980). It is true that the 
density of tactile receptors is not the same over the surface of the body. At the 
phenomenological level, there can be differences between specific parts of the body (such 
as the bony forehead and the plump cheek). But there is no difference between two sites 
that are slightly apart on the same body part or between two similar sites on both sides of 
the body (left and right hands, for example). Furthermore, it is one thing to notice a 
difference – if there is any – between a sensation on the back of the hand and a sensation 
on the palm. It is another thing to localize this sensation on the palm. Specific qualitative 
coloring may be the natural sign of the body site of the sensation: its experience cannot 
but betray the location of the sensation in the same way that smoke cannot but betray the 
presence of a fire. Nonetheless, the presence of smoke needs to be interpreted on the basis 
of prior knowledge about the systematic association between smoke and fire. Likewise, 
the experience of a specific qualitative coloring needs to be interpreted on the basis of 
prior knowledge about the systematic association between the local sign and a specific 
body site. In particular, proponents of any theory that denies that tactile sensations are 
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spatially individuated are committed to posit a purely contingent relation between tactile 
sensations and their spatial ascription, which seems unlikely (Brentano, 1979; Coburn, 
1966; Holly, 1986). In addition, they are committed to accept the possibility of floating 
tactile sensations, that is, tactile sensations with no apparent location. But can one feel 
tactile sensations without at least roughly ascribing the sensations to particular parts of 
the body?  
This might be possible in the case of bodily feelings, like thirst or hunger (Armstrong, 
1962). However, in the case of touch, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to conceive 
feeling pressure nowhere in particular.
 7
 As argued in section 1, pressure is a dynamical 
relation between bodies, and bodies necessarily occupy regions of space. Consequently, 
experiencing pressure is experiencing pressure in a region of space. This seems to be 
confirmed by some recent empirical results that show that there is a systematic 
relationship between tactile sensations and localization. On the one hand, the more 
spatially determinate the sensation is, the less it takes time to experience pressure. For 
instance, it was found that we are faster to detect pressure when viewing the body part 
that is touched (Tipper et al., 2001). One possible explanation is that viewing the touched 
body part facilitates the localization of pressure, thus allowing pressure to be experienced 
more quickly. On the other hand, the less spatially determinate the sensation is, the more 
it takes time to experience pressure. For instance, it was shown that when we are 
uncertain about the location of pressure (because of a conflict between visual information 
and proprioceptive information, for instance), we take longer to detect pressure (Folegatti 
                                                        
7 Even young infants, who cannot communicate the localization of their sensation, can orient their attention 
toward the location of pressure, as shown by a range of neonatal reflexes (such as automatically grasping 
unseen objects in contact with the hand) and voluntary behaviors (such as looking toward the bodily site 
that is touched, cf. Bremner et al., 2008). Furthermore, as far as we know, there has been no report of 
patients who experience sensations that are not at least approximately localized. Head and Holmes (1911, p. 
139) describe the case of a patient who claims: ―I feel you touch me, but I can‘t tell where it is‖. But the 
patient further reports: ―The touch oozes all through my hand‖. This indicates that tactile localization can 
be more or less indeterminate. It can also be more or less accurate. But this is not to be confused with 
tactile sensation with no localization whatsoever. 
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et al., 2009; Moseley et al., 2008). Roughly speaking, one has no sensation as long as one 
cannot localize where the pressure is applied. Taken all together, these results suggest 
that to be aware of pressure is to be aware of a location of pressure, though not 
necessarily correctly. The location of pressure is part of the individuation conditions of 
tactile sensations (Margolis, 1966, Brentano 1979). 
To conclude, the spatiality of tactile sensations may be peculiar compared to the 
spatiality of visual experiences for instance, but this does not suffice to show that tactile 
sensations are not essentially spatial. Rather, it invites us to deepen our understanding of 
tactile spatiality. 
 
2.2 The body map theory 
Contrary to the Local sign theory as described by James, tactile sensations 
immediately cries to us ‗I am here‘. However, to be aware that one is touched here is one 
thing, and to locate where ‗here‘ is another thing. A cross indicating ―you are here‖ is of 
little interest if there is no reference point on the map. Likewise, tactile localization 
requires a spatial frame of reference, which is classically defined as ―a locus or set of loci 
with respect to which spatial position is defined‘ (Pick & Lockman, 1981, p. 40). In the 
case of tactile sensations, the set of loci is not provided by tactile signals themselves. If I 
am touched on the right index finger, the peripheral neural signal originating from the 
right index finger carries information about the location of the stimulation only. It does 
not carry the information that this is an index finger, or that it is located on the right hand. 
Thus, it does not suffice to fully account for the spatiality of tactile sensations. For tactile 
sensations to get a relatively rich and accurate spatial content, raw spatial tactile signals 
need to be interpreted with the help of a topological and geometric mental map of the 
body (hereafter body map).  
The notion of body map can be tracked back to Bonnier (1905), who first introduced 
the notion of schema to refer to the spatial organization of bodily sensations. Head and 
Holmes (1911) also posit the existence of what they call a superficial schema, which is 
the model of the skin surface of the body used for localizing bodily sensations. More 
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recently, Schwoebel and Coslett (2005) argue in favor of what they call a body structural 
description, which is impaired in patients suffering from autotopagnosia. These patients 
are not able to correctly localize where they are touched and identify the parts of their 
body. But it is O‘Shaughnessy (1980, 1995) who best develops the body map theory. He 
postulates the existence of a long-term body image in order to compensate for the 
intrinsic insufficiency of the body senses. The long-term body image explains how all 
bodily experiences share the same spatial content of the structural shape of the body over 
an extended period. It is thanks to the body map that tactile sensations are experienced as 
being at more than at an isolated body point. The body map plays a structural role in 
spatially shaping tactile sensations. In other words, it plays the role of a somatosensory 
field (Martin, 1992). In visual experiences, visual properties are localized relatively to the 
visual field. In tactile experiences, pressure is localized relatively to the body map.  
Although the body map represents long-term properties of the body such as the size 
of the limbs, it is flexible and can quickly adjust to changes. The body boundaries that we 
experience can actually stretch beyond the biological body boundaries to include either 
non-physical extension like phantom limbs or physical extensions like tools (Vesey, 
1961; O‘Shaughnessy, 1980; Martin, 1995). For example, the felt size of our limbs can be 
temporarily altered for the time of acting with a tool (Cardinali et al., 2009). Once the 
action achieved and the tool dropped off, the body map readjusts to the normal size of the 
body. We may think of it in terms of plastic band: we can stretch it as much as we want 
but it always comes back to its default size. It is worth noting here that the body map does 
not necessarily represent the agentive body (space of the body used in action). Phantom 
limbs can be paralyzed. Furthermore, the body map can be altered by the mere distorted 
vision of one‘s static limbs (Taylor-Clarke et al., 2004).8 The body map is neither 
necessarily the representation of the affective body (space of the body where one can feel 
pleasure and pain). We indeed use a spoon to stir the pot of boiling soup, rightly unafraid 
to feel pain in the spoon. Nor does the body map necessarily include a self-referential 
component (space of one‘s body qua one’s own). Indeed, unlike phantom limbs, we do 
not feel tools as our own body parts. As Botvinick (2004, p. 783) noted, ―the feeling of 
                                                        
8
 For a multimodal view of the body map (and of bodily expériences), see Vignemont (under revision). 
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ownership that we have for our bodies clearly does not extend to, for example, the fork 
we use at dinner‖. 
If tactile localization were constrained by the felt boundaries of the body, as 
represented by the body map, rather than by the biological limits of the body, then one 
should be able to feel sensations in phantom limbs, in tools or in any other object 
represented within the body map. And indeed amputees can experience sensations in their 
phantom limb: ―A draught of air on the stump produces the feeling of a draught on the 
[phantom] foot.‖ (James, 1887, p. 258). Likewise, they can experience sensations in their 
prosthesis: ―That may sound strange, but to me, my prosthesis is an extension of my 
body. I can actually ‗feel‘ some things that come into contact with it, without having to 
see them‖ (in Murray, 2004, p. 970). It has been even found that even individuals with a 
healthy and complete body can feel sensations in a prosthetic rubber hand (Botvinick and 
Cohen, 1998). In the Rubber Hand Illusion, healthy subjects sit with their left arm resting 
on a table, hidden behind a screen. They are asked to fixate on a rubber hand in front of 
them, and the experimenter simultaneously strokes the participant‘s hand and the fake 
hand with two paintbrushes. After a short while, the majority of participants report that 
they feel the touch of the paintbrush at the location where they see the rubber hand being 
touched: ―It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the paintbrush in the location where I 
saw the rubber hand touched‖ (item 3 in the questionnaire in Botvinick and Cohen, 1998, 
p. 756). 
Finally, one can experience sensations at the tip of a tool like Descartes‘ blind man 
with his cane, if the body map has incorporated the cane. Sensations in tools are not a 
mere way of speaking (Katz, 1925; Lotze, 1888; Gibson, 1966; Martin, 1993; 
O‘Shaughnessy, 2003). First, localization in tools appears as direct. One does not need 
any training before feelings sensations in tools. The first time blind people use their cane, 
they immediately feel the solidity of the floor in the cane. Moreover, one could not have a 
fine-grained control over the tool if one was aware only inferentially that the pressure and 
the forces were located in the tool: ―Pen and brush would be clumsy instruments in the 
hand of the clerk or the painter, if we did not directly feel their contact with the paper‖ 
(Lotze, 1888, Bk V, p. 588-9). Finally, it has been found that the localization of touch in 
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tools follows the same principle as the localization of touch in hands (Yamamoto and 
Kitazawa, 2001b; for more details, see section 2.3).  
We have argued that the localization of tactile sensations uses the body map as spatial 
reference frame. However, the body map theory can be true only if exosomesthesia is 
impossible, that is, if there is no case of extrapersonal sensations localized independently 
from the body. As argued, pressure is necessarily experienced as of being located. But is 
it necessarily located as of being located on the body? Only cases of exosomesthesia can 
show that there is no bodily constraint that lays upon tactile localization. We shall now 
analyze three series of cases that may cast doubt on the body map theory. Interestingly, 
these cases are almost the only cases of exosomesthesia reported in the literature in more 
than a century of research on the localization of bodily sensations. If there were no bodily 
constraint on tactile localization, then one might have expected more cases. 
 
2.3 Is there no limit to where we can feel tactile sensations?   
But if the observer was permitted to see the movements of the loudspeaker in 
the room and coordinate them with the sensations on his arms, after some 
training he began to project the skin sensations out into the room. (Von 
Békésy, 1959, p. 14) 
Von Bekesy‘s report seems to indicate that one can feel tactile sensations in external 
objects with no spatial contiguity and no spatial resemblance with the body. If this were 
true, then one should be able to feel sensations anywhere, maybe as far as the moon, as 
suggested by Armel and Ramachandran (2003, p. 1500): 
If you looked through a telescope at the moon and used an optical trick to 
stroke and touch it in synchrony with your hand, would you ‗project‘ the 
sensations to the moon? 
Martin (1995) disqualifies von Bekesy‘s report because, he claims, the loudspeaker is 
felt within the extension of the body. But why would it be so? Martin cannot appeal to the 
fact that participants feel sensations in it for risk of circularity. And there seems to be no 
other plausible explanation for the embodiment of the loudspeaker. In particular, it cannot 
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be explained as a kind of Rubber Hand Illusion. It was indeed found that multisensory 
correlation could result in the embodiment of an external object if the object was bodily 
shaped such as a rubber hand, but not if it did not look like a body part, like a wooden 
spoon (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005), or a loudspeaker.  
 A different strategy to disqualify von Bekesy‘s results consists in denying that 
subjects localize sensations in the loudspeaker. More precisely, they localize sensations 
there, but only indirectly. For example, when talking on the phone, I directly localize 
your voice close to my ear, and indirectly localize it in your office from which you are 
calling. Indirect localization is grounded on direct localization: with no knowledge on the 
functioning of the phone, I would localize your voice only close to my ear. Likewise, 
bodily sensations can be directly and indirectly localized.
9
 Following von Bekesy‘s own 
description, we suggest that participants do not immediately experience sensations in the 
loudspeaker, but rather learn to ―project‖ their sensations there. In our terminology, they 
indirectly localize tactile sensations in the loudspeaker. The rules that govern indirect 
localization are not necessarily the same as the rules that govern direct localization. 
Consequently, this result is not relevant for the study of the constraints that lay upon 
direct localization of tactile sensations, which is our primary concern here.  
If Martin‘s strategy fails to account for von Bekesy‘s results, it is more successful in 
the case of a recent study that uses a well-known tactile illusion, namely, the cutaneous 
rabbit illusion: repeated rapid tactile stimulation at the wrist, then near the elbow, can 
create the illusion of touches at intervening locations along the arm, as if a rabbit hopped 
along it. In Miyazaki and coll. (2010)‘s version of the study, participants lifted up a stick 
between their two fingers until it was in contact with the system that delivered 
mechanical pulses on the fingers via the stick. They received a series of tactile 
stimulations on their left index finger, then on their right index finger. Participants then 
reported feeling touches between the two fingers, that is, on the stick that they were 
holding. The authors concluded that tactile sensations could ―hop out of the body‖. Out of 
                                                        
9
 For instance, when having a heart attack, I experience the pain primarily in my left arm, but I can also 
experience the pain derivatively in my heart if I am aware that the pain in my left arm indicates a heart 
attack.  
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the biological body, yes, but do they hop out of the body map? This is less certain. Unlike 
von Bekesy‘s loudspeaker, one can suggest a plausible account of the embodiment of the 
stick within the body map, which does not fall into circularity. The stick can actually be 
easily conceived as a tool manipulated by the participants to interact with the stimulating 
device. As such, it can be experienced as an extension of the body. Tactile sensations 
experienced on the stick are then not more surprising than sensations in tools.  
The final series of putative cases of exosomesthesia comes from patient studies. An 
amputated patient reported feeling a sensation ―in space distal to the [phantom]-finger-
tips" when his stump was stimulated (Cronholm, 1951, p. 190). Another patient 
―mislocalized the stimulus to the left hand into space near that hand" (Shapiro and coll., 
1952, p. 484). Unfortunately, we have little information on these patients.
10
 Still, it is 
interesting to note that these reports are congruent with further results from von Bekesy 
(1967). He reports having used vibrotactile stimulation to induce in healthy subjects 
sensations located in the region of empty space between two spread fingers and between 
the outspread thighs. In all those cases, sensations are localized in the space close to the 
body. It is now well known that space immediately surrounding the body, which is known 
as peripersonal space, is represented in a special way (Ladavas and Farne, 2004). For 
instance, when a threatening object enters a spatial margin of safety around their body, 
animals engage in a range of protective behaviors (Dosey & Meisels, 1969; Cooke and 
Graziano, 2003). In humans, it was found that viewing a light close to a part of one‘s 
body interfered with simultaneous tactile sensations, if the location of the light was 
incongruent with the location of the tactile stimuli (Spence et al., 2004). The special 
significance of peripersonal space can be explained in various ways. It may correspond to 
a spatial overestimation of the boundaries of the body. Arguably, the brain computes the 
boundaries of the body, but taking into account some margin of spatial errors. From an 
evolutionary perspective, it is actually safer to overestimate the body boundaries than to 
                                                        
10
 For instance, does the amputated patient normally wear a prosthetic arm, which may be longer than his 
phantom arm? What other disorders does Shapiro‘s patient suffer from? Both patients report feeling 
sensations beyond the end of their body part phantom or physical, but would they agree if asked whether 
they feel sensations outside their body? 
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underestimate them. Alternatively, the representation of peripersonal space may play an 
anticipatory role. Objects immediately surrounding the body are likely to be in contact 
with the body in a very close future. On both interpretations, peripersonal space is 
perceived as potentially the space of the body. Its spatial frame of reference is centered 
on body parts (if the body part moves, then peripersonal space follows, cf. Kennett et al., 
2002). Consequently, tactile sensations that are localized in peripersonal space are not 
localized independently from the body. They are localized relative to a bodily frame of 
reference.  
To recap, the burden of proof is on the side of those who defend the view that tactile 
sensations can be felt in the outside world. We have analyzed a series of apparent cases of 
exosomesthesia, but for each case, there is always an alternative interpretation, which 
respects our basic intuitions about the spatial relation between tactile sensations and the 
body. The body map theory then explains the constraints that lay upon the spatiality of 
tactile sensations. Tactile sensations are necessarily localized relatively to the boundaries 
of the felt body because the frame of reference exploited by tactile sensations consists in 
the body map. Hence, when I feel a tactile sensation on my hand, I do not feel it on my 
hand as opposed to another hand. In contrast, when I see a red spot on my hand, I see it 
on my hand as opposed to many other hands. This is a fundamental difference between 
tactile experiences and visual experiences (Martin, 1995).  
A last precision needs to be added. The body map is not the only frame of reference of 
tactile sensations. If it were the only reference frame, then the posture of the body should 
not affect tactile sensations: within the bodily frame, a sensation on the right hand 
remains on the right hand and a sensation on the left hand remains on the left hand even 
when the hands are crossed. However, crossing hands matters. If you cross your hands 
over your body midline with your eyes closed and if your left hand is briefly touched, and 
then your right hand, you take more time and you are less accurate in judging where the 
first touch occurred (Yamamoto and Kitazawa, 2001a). Furthermore, you experience the 
same difficulties if you cross two sticks with your hands uncrossed (Yamamoto and 
Kitazawa, 2001b). Your difficulties could not be explained if tactile sensations were 
mapped only relatively to the body map. Rather, they result from the localization of 
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tactile sensations in the external world (e.g., on the left), which comes into conflict with 
their localization on the body (e.g., on the right hand). Pressure is therefore encoded at 
being at two distinct locations, what Bermudez (2005) calls A-location (i.e. within the 
bodily frame independent of the posture of the body) and B-location (i.e. within an 
external frame relative to the posture of the body). In O‘Shaughnessy‘s terms, we 
experience sensations ―at-a-part-of-body-at-a-point-in-body-relative-space‖.  
This is not to say, however, that we localize sensations ―relative to the fixed stars‖ 
independently of bodily localization (O‘Shaughnessy, 1980, vol. I, p. 184). This is neither 
to say that we experience pressure first in external space, and only secondarily on the 
body part that happens to be at this specific region in space. If it were the case, then one 
should be able to localize tactile sensations independently from the body. It is rather the 
reverse. The body map is the primary frame of reference. Tactile sensations are localized 
within the external frame only insofar they are localized within the body map. More 
precisely, B-location derives from the combined experience of A-location (which body 
part is touched) and of bodily posture (where the touched body part is in space).  
 
To conclude, the localization of tactile sensations requires a dual specification, both in 
terms of tactile signals and in terms of body map, which is used as spatial reference 
frame. Tactile sensations have therefore a privileged relation to bodily awareness. This is 
not to say, however, that this relation is the ‗mark‘ of tactile sensations. It is actually 
shared with other bodily sensations, including pain, thermal perception, tickles and 
kinesthetic sensations. As argued, the mark of touch is that it is the only perceptual 
process that carries information about pressure. The body map theory is fully compatible 
with our earlier rejection of the body template theory. The body map theory and the body 
template theory must indeed be distinguished, although O‘Shaughnessy (and to some 
extent Martin
11
) defend them both. They differ both in their explanandum and in their 
explanans. The body template theory aims to explain the spatial properties felt in tactile 
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 Martin‘s account is exclusively at the phenomenological level. He does not appeal to the notion of a 
mental representation of the body, unlike O‘Shaughnessy.  
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perception (e.g., I feel a circular shape) whereas the body map theory aims to explain the 
spatial location of tactile objects (e.g., I feel pressure at the tip of my finger).  To this end, 
the body template theory appeals to proprioception (dynamic sense of bodily posture) 
whereas the body map theory appeals to the body map (relatively stable mental 
representation of the structural bodily shape). One can therefore defend the body map 
theory without necessarily defending the body template theory. Tactile sensations consist 
in sensations of pressure localized within the reference frame of our body map. 
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